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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis examines the port visits of two U.S. naval deployments to Latin 
America (USS AMERICA [LHA 6] in 2014 and the USS GUNSTON HALL [LSD 44] in 
2018) to find what strategic effects the United States is achieving through this aspect of 
naval diplomacy. Using an original framework, the study compares primary Latin 
American news sources to U.S. press releases that cover the visits to identify influence 
and relates those findings to bilateral relationships, theater objectives, and routine 
operational activities. Overall, the United States is attaining positive diplomatic influence 
through the use of port calls; however, there is room for improvement and the Navy’s 
approach can be optimized to better achieve effects in support of strategic regional 
objectives. Particularly, matching U.S. actions and events in-port to overall U.S. security 
policies and enlisting the support of the relevant U.S. embassies can increase the 
opportunities and likelihood of success in acquiring influence. Attaining U.S. soft power 
through naval diplomacy in Latin America will only continue to grow in importance with 
the return to great power competition and the need to counter the encroachment of 
Chinese influence throughout the region. 
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Port visits by foreign warships follow a long tradition of fulfilling a diplomatic role. 
This tactic of naval diplomacy involves operations designed to accomplish the strategic 
objectives of strengthening alliances, building relations, and deterring hostile actions by 
known and potentially unknown adversaries.1 In my first two operational sea tours, most 
of the port visits we conducted in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of responsibility (AoR) (i.e., 
Europe and Africa), supported one or more of these objectives outside the more standard 
tasks of re-supply or crew-rest that are commonplace in naval deployments. Significant 
strategic and operational level value was achieved in the ports we visited through the 
execution of diplomatically oriented tasks such as showing U.S. naval presence, hosting 
and attending events with host leadership, and conducting joint in-port security cooperation 
exercises.2 Since becoming a Western Hemisphere major at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, I have often questioned how this facet of naval diplomacy translates to the 4th Fleet 
AoR, which includes the countries of Central and South America and the Caribbean. More 
specifically, What are the effects of conducting U.S. naval port visits in Latin America, 
especially those that pertain to U.S. interests in the region? 
This research question becomes particularly puzzling when taken in the context of 
the history of U.S.–Latin American relations. The region, over time, has developed an 
intense animosity toward American interventionism that has been earned in good part by 
U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Expeditionary Forces.3 Consequently, the study considers 
the historical and current relations between the U.S. and its Latin American partners as a 
 
1 “The Port Call Issue: Nordic Considerations,” Bulletin of Peace Proposals 21, no. 3 (July 1, 1990): 
337–52, https://doi.org/10.1177/096701069002100311. 
2 “USS Donald Cook Welcomes President of Romania,” U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. 6th 
Fleet Public Affairs, April 15, 2014, https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=80370; “US Navy 
Destroyer Welcomes Ukrainian President during Port Call,” Navy Times, February 26, 2019, 
https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2019/02/27/us-navy-destroyer-welcomes-ukrainian-president-
during-port-call/. 
3 Peter H. Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, the United States, and the World, Fourth (New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013), chaps. 2, 7. 
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critical piece of its investigation into the achieved influence and diplomatic effects of naval 
port calls.  
To answer the research question, this study investigates the port visits of two recent 
U.S. naval deployments to the AoR using an original framework for analysis. First, this 
framework identifies any relevant background contextual factors for the particular 
deployment, such as the type of warship or the overarching theater-specific objectives for 
the voyage. After establishing the deployment’s context, the framework transitions to 
examine each port call independently to identify the achieved impact and what factors 
either contributed to or hampered U.S. diplomatic efforts. Within this visit-specific 
analysis, the investigations into the U.S. actions while in-port and the cross comparisons 
of U.S. press releases and host nation/Spanish-language news sources offer the most 
significant and telling components of the framework and research.  
The study’s findings show that the U.S. is achieving positive diplomatic effects that 
complement U.S. Southern Command’s (SOUTHCOM) strategic objectives of 
strengthening partnerships and building partner capacity. The analysis, however, reveals 
that these effects can vary due to several factors. Fortunately, a number of these factors are 
controllable and, therefore, optimizable with proper planning and coordination. Examples 
of these variables include matching U.S. actions in-port with overarching bilateral security 
cooperation policies and enlisting the support of the relevant U.S. Embassy to amplify the 
visit’s diplomatic messaging throughout the host country. 
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION  
This research on Latin American port visits has plenty of policy implications for 
naval leaders and planners, ranging from those stationed in 4th Fleet and SOUTHCOM 
headquarters to those State Department and Foreign Area Officers stationed in Latin 
America. If able to correctly identify the desired effects these port calls and, more 
specifically, what does and does not work in achieving U.S. national interests via the visits, 
leaders and planners could tailor their security cooperation and forward presence policies 
accordingly.  
3 
This research contributes to the overall knowledge surrounding naval diplomacy, 
security cooperation, and forward presence operations while simultaneously filling the 
gaps concerning port visits within these larger U.S. naval missions. Up to this point, most 
scholars in the field have centered their research on theoretical aspects that identify the 
mission’s characteristics but rarely its effects.  
Measuring diplomatic influence is notoriously difficult, and therefore, little 
scholarship focuses on the impact of routine port visits. This gap is especially apparent in 
the Latin American region, where studies on peacetime maritime operations are 
exceedingly sparse. While the field has struggled to accurately track the impact of 
diplomatic actions, this study’s original framework, which examines primary news sources 
from the host nation, provides a promising new approach for identifying influence and 
effects. The real strength of the framework lies in its ability to relate influential effects to 
overarching and contextual factors like operational objectives or the historical and bilateral 
relationship of the relevant countries. Analysts can utilize this new approach in future 
projects that concern security cooperation, influence, diplomacy, and soft power. 
Research on achieving influence in Latin America will only continue to grow in 
importance as the U.S. military continues to transition to a focus on great power 
competition.4 Acquiring influence and building relationships in the region gives the U.S. 
an advantage over traditional rivals like Russia and China, two states vying for influence 
and power within resource-rich Latin America.5  
While this the primary audience of this research is leaders and planners focused on 
the SOUTHCOM/4th Fleet AoR, the findings apply to other U.S. naval fleets and their 
relative regions. In other words, this study’s results can help develop policies and 
procedures for ships operating outside the waters of Latin America.  
 
 
4 Ronald O’Rourke, “Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for 
Congress” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 7, 2020). 
5 Sam LaGrone, “Faller: Navy Deployments to SOUTHCOM About More Than Just Drug 
Trafficking,” USNI News, February 7, 2020, sec. News & Analysis, https://news.usni.org/2020/02/07/
faller-navy-deployments-to-southcom-about-more-than-just-drug-trafficking. 
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B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review is broken down into three sections: Defense and Naval 
Diplomacy, Diplomatic Influence, and U.S.-Latin American Relations. 
1. Defense and Naval Diplomacy 
The political objectives sought by warships visiting ports of friendly countries fall 
squarely in the concept of naval diplomacy, which is further nested under the more 
encompassing subject of defense diplomacy. Starting at the higher level, Cottey and Forster 
define defense diplomacy as the “peacetime cooperative use of armed forces and related 
infrastructure (primarily defence ministries) as a tool of foreign and security policy.”6 
Essentially, defense diplomacy covers a wide range of activities, from high-level 
discussions between senior military and civilian defense leaders to the lower-level 
interactions included in the port visits discussed here. A rich and well-researched subject,7 
defense diplomacy is critical to filling in the gaps between the front-line diplomatic 
influence obtained in port visits and the broader strategic-level international relations 
policies.  
The concept of naval diplomacy is the maritime contribution to defense diplomacy. 
Scholars often argue it to be the most effective and versatile in obtaining influence among 
different service types.8 In his writings on the theory of naval diplomacy, J.J. Widen 
defines the concept as “the use of naval force as a political instrument short of war.”9 
Inherently broad for a reason, Widen left his definition fairly open-ended as there are 
 
6 Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster, “Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military 
Cooperation and Assistance,” The Adelphi Papers 44, no. 365 (May 1, 2004): 6, https://doi.org/10.1080/
714027953. 
7See Cottey and Forster, “Reshaping Defence Diplomacy.”; See Seng Tan, “Military Diplomacy” in 
The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy, ed. Pauline Kerr and Paul Sharp (London: SAGE. 2016); Juan Emilio 
Cheyre, “Defense Diplomacy,” in The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, ed. Andrew Cooper, Jorge 
Heine, Ramesh Thakur (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Anton Du Plessis, “Defense Diplomacy: 
Conceptual and Practical Dimensions with Specific Reference to South Africa” Strategic Review for 
Southern Africa 30, no. 2 (2008), https://repository.up.ac.za/handle/2263/10381 
8See Laurence W. Martin, The Sea in Modern Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1967), 134; J. J. Widen, 
“Naval Diplomacy: A Theoretical Approach,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 22, no. 4 (December 1, 2011): 15, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2011.625830. 
9 Widen, “Naval Diplomacy: A Theoretical Approach,” 719. 
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several reasons and ways to employ naval force in a diplomatic role. To better understand 
the diplomatic role of navies, it is best to review the original theorists of naval diplomacy: 
Ken Booth, James Cable, Edward Luttwak, and Laurence Martin. Written in the 1970s, the 
analysis of these theorists centered on the new peacetime roles that the large navies of the 
United States and the USSR found themselves in as notions of détente and deterrence began 
to pervade naval operations. Although heavily influenced by the cold war, much of the 
analysis within these theories has remained authoritative and has given rise to an expansive 
research field. 
Scholars and planners often break naval diplomacy down into two distinct policies 
for obtaining influence: those that seek to coerce and those that seek to support. Kevin 
Rowlands illustrates this distinction by separating the policies into those of enmity and 
amity.10 Those policies that pursue coercion, deterrence, or information gathering are 
enmity, while those that seek cooperation, reassurance, and assistance are amity. While the 
field generally agrees upon this distinction, two separate camps have formed, with one side 
focusing on enmity and the other giving equal time to both or solely focusing on amity.  
Those in the enmity camp tend to center their writings on the popular theory of 
gunboat diplomacy. The early works of both James Cable11 and Admiral Stansfield Turner 
popularized the concept.12 More recently, the approach has expanded with the publications 
of contemporary authors like Christian Le Mière, who defines it as “the overt display, 
demonstration, threat or use of limited sea-based force by a state or non-state actor designed 
to coerce an opponent to further a political goal, often unstated, by compellence or 
deterrence.”13 Though the use of gunboat diplomacy has declined since the end of the cold 
 
10 Kevin Rowlands, Naval Diplomacy in 21st Century: A Model for the Post-Cold War Global Order 
(Routledge, 2018), 52, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429460951. 
11 James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy 1919–1991: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force, 
Studies in International Security (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1994), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-
349-23415-8_7. 
12 Stansfield Turner, “Missions of the U.S. Navy,” Naval War College Review 27, no. 2 (June 15, 
2018), https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol27/iss2/2. 
13 Christian Le Mière, Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century: Drivers and Challenges (Routledge, 
2014), chaps. 1, 2, 7, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203555590. 
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war,14 the coercive side is still pertinent to a study on port visits in Latin America for a 
few reasons. The first reason is that otherwise friendly port visits can contain coercive, 
deterrent, or compellent undertones. The port visits can “act as a reminder to the intended 
audience [host country] of the capabilities of the visiting navy and hence a possible 
deterrent to aggression,”15 even though that same host country has to extend some sort of 
invitation or diplomatic clearance before the visit. 
The second reason is that a friendly port visit might fulfill amity objectives to the 
host state while at the same time signal enmity to a neighboring state.16 As an example, 
Admiral Caperton’s multi-ship visit to Brazil during WWI signaled support for the 
Brazilian termination of diplomatic ties with Germany and, at the same time, sent coercive 
signals to Argentina, which had yet to do the same.17 The third reason is the history of 
diplomatic intervention conducted by the U.S. Navy throughout the region of Latin 
America, which this review details in a subsequent section.  
On the amity side of the spectrum, the writings of Ken Booth, Edward Luttwak, 
and the contemporary Kevin Rowlands offer salient analyses to a study on port visits. 
Rowlands describes the amity side as diplomacy that “professes to further national interests 
not through threat or the limited use of force but through outreach, international 
engagement, and conflict prevention.”18 Present in this body of work are frameworks for 
analyzing the different aims, means, and effects of the amity side naval diplomacy, 
including Luttwak’s seminal discussion on “suasion,” which offers a way to connect the 
specific influence sought with the employment of maritime components in a diplomatic 
role.19 Also contained in this body of work are specific sections dedicated to port visits’ 
characteristics and effects. Of particular importance is Booth’s partition of port visits into 
 
14 Rowlands, Naval Diplomacy in 21st Century, 52. 
15 Le Mière, Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century, 23. 
16 Le Mière, 23. 
17 David Healy, “Admiral William B. Caperton and United States Naval Diplomacy in South 
America, 1917–1919,” Journal of Latin American Studies 8, no. 2 (1976): 297–323. 
18 Rowlands, Naval Diplomacy in 21st Century, chap. 1, pg. 13. 
19 Edward Luttwak, The Political Uses of Sea Power (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 
1974). 
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two types: routine operational visits conducted during a standard deployment and goodwill 
visits completed solely for diplomatic purposes.20  
Although fairly vast, the literature on defense and naval diplomacy contains little 
on the Latin American region outside the historical instances of gunboat diplomacy or 
significant historical events. No literature includes an analysis of the effects of recent port 
visits within Latin America. Further research is required beyond defense and naval 
diplomacy to fill this gap in scholarship.  
2. Diplomatic Influence 
The seminal publications on naval diplomacy outlined in the previous section often 
include dedicated portions on influence and effects. However, the writings tend to focus 
on the coercive side as it is the more popular subcategory within the literature. Port visits, 
though, are naturally amity-seeking, and therefore, this review requires further discussion 
on diplomatic influence, especially the impact obtained through means other than coercion 
or compellence.  
Well suited to the amity side of naval diplomacy is Joseph Nye’s concept of soft 
power and the large body of research that has followed. Though technically a type of power 
and not influence, the terms are practically synonymous as Nye defines power as “the 
ability to influence the behavior of others.”21 Nye identifies soft power as an alternative to 
the inducements or threats (carrots or sticks) associated with hard power and holds that soft 
power is “getting others to want the outcomes you want” and that it “co-opts people rather 
than coerces them.”22 In the dichotomy of naval diplomacy, states exercise hard power 
through coercive gunboat diplomacy and soft power through amity-seeking, supportive 
diplomacy. Nye’s concept of soft power was first published in 1990 and has spurred a large 
field of research on the topic. Ernest Wilson’s writing on smart power is of considerable 
 
20 Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy (Routledge, 2014), chap. 2, pg. 41, https://doi.org/10.4324/
9781315769646. 
21 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 1st ed. (New York: Public 
Affairs, 2004), 2. 
22 Nye, Jr., 5. 
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relevance to this field and port visits in general. Wilson’s policy application incorporates 
both hard power and soft power aspects and, therefore, encompasses naval diplomacy in 
toto.23  
Stemming from the theory of soft power is public diplomacy, a concept described 
by Nancy Snow as “the way in which both government and private individuals and groups 
influence directly and indirectly those public attitudes and opinions that bear directly on 
another government’s foreign policy decisions.”24 Essentially, public diplomacy is one 
government influencing the public opinion within another to obtain some national 
objective. Port visits naturally include interaction and engagement of the local population. 
Therefore, port calls are uniquely equipped to influence public opinion through public 
diplomacy.  
To understand the effects of port visits in Latin America, research is required on 
the nature of influence inherent to naval diplomacy. For the most part, authors agree that 
the diplomatic effects sought through naval means (1) are difficult to measure, (2) have 
significant limitations, and (3) vary based upon execution and context. To the first point, 
Linton Brooks argues that naval diplomatic influence “is likely to be subtle and indirect 
and not as easy to discern or to measure.”25 Though difficult to measure, Brooks explains 
that naval diplomacy is still a useful tool, and U.S. planners and leaders should not overlook 
this aspect when seeking to advance American interests. To the second point, naval 
diplomacy is relatively limited when analyzed independently, primarily when directed at 
the host nation’s domestic institutions, social infrastructure, cultural norms, and 
inequality.26 It is better, then, to analyze naval diplomacy as one element in a larger 
 
23 Ernest J. Wilson, “Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power,” The ANNALS of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (March 1, 2008): 111, https://doi.org/10.1177/
0002716207312618. 
24 Nancy Snow, Rethinking Public Diplomacy (Routledge Handbooks Online, 2008), 6, 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203891520.ch1. 
25 Linton F. Brooks, Peacetime Influence Through Forward Naval Presence (Alexandria, VA: Center 
for Naval Analyses, 1993), 7. 
26 Douglas M. Fraser, “Examining DOD Security Cooperation: When It Works and When It Doesn’t,” 
§ House Armed Services Committee (2015). 
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diplomatic strategy that incorporates political and economic means in addition to those of 
the military.27 
To the third and possibly most salient point, effects achieved from conducting port 
calls vary based on the visit’s execution and the surrounding context. On the execution 
side, the impact can vary based on several factors, including how often the visits are 
conducted or the type of ship used. On the latter point, Brooks argues that aircraft carriers 
often send signals of coercion, while amphibious ships send interventionist signals.28 
Context is perhaps the most crucial factor when determining the effects of port visits. 
Contextually, a U.S. port visit to Latvia has much more potential to achieve both support 
(Latvia) and deterrent (Russia) based effects than a routine visit to Canada. The context 
surrounding Latin America is incredibly nuanced and therefore worthy of detailed 
discussion. 
3. U.S.–Latin American Relations 
Essential to understanding the effects of naval port visits in Latin America is the 
historical relationship between the region and the United States. Booth maintains that 
context matters when conducting ship visits, especially the historical experiences, world 
outlook, and ideology of the local populace.29 In Latin America, these contextual factors 
are substantially complex and heavily influenced by a history of U.S. hegemony, 
neocolonialism, and intervention. There is a wide-ranging breadth of literature on the 
relationship, especially within the field of international relations.  
U.S. hegemony within the Western Hemisphere has had a profound effect on U.S.–
Latin American relations. After its territorial expansion, the U.S. sought to build a sphere 
of influence over Latin America using economic and political means at the European 
powers’ expense.30 Once established, the sphere of influence formed a one-sided 
relationship between the U.S. and Latin America that was economically exploitative and 
 
27 Brooks, Peacetime Influence, 22. 
28 Brooks, 16. 
29 Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, chap. 2, pg. 67. 
30 Smith, Talons of the Eagle, chap. 2. 
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extractive. Scholars and politicians from Latin America often refer to this phenomenon as 
either U.S. imperialism or neocolonialism.31 The idea was that Latin American states 
fulfilled many roles of traditional colonies to the U.S. through exploitation and dependence, 
even though they were technically independent countries.  
Throughout the 20th century, the U.S. interventions in Latin America were abundant 
and have had a lasting impact on the region. The U.S. Navy and Marines usually carried 
out the earlier interventions to collect the debt owed to foreign lenders or to install 
democratic regimes in place of authoritarian ones.32 During the Cold War, the later 
interventions took place as the U.S. oversaw or supported regime change that saw leftist 
governments replaced with anti-communist ones, regardless of regime-type (democratic or 
authoritarian).33  
This history of neocolonialism and interventionism has shaped how Latin 
Americans view the United States and its military. These historical factors could have 
significant consequences on achieving influence and the host nation’s perception of U.S. 
port visits. Any effects either sought or obtained through naval diplomacy should take into 
consideration this context.  
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The remainder of this thesis is comprised of three chapters which include two case 
studies and a conclusion. The case studies examine the USS AMERICA’s 2014 homeport-
shift to San Diego and the USS GUNSTON HALL’s 2018 deployment to the Caribbean in 
support of multiple theater-specific exercises.  
To ascertain the effects of conducting port calls in Latin America, this research 
examines primary sources covering recent 4th Fleet deployments to the region. Case studies 
consist of the visits that a single U.S. warship conducted throughout one SOUTHCOM 
 
31 See Greg Grandin, Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New 
Imperialism (Macmillan, 2006).; Eduardo Galeano, Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of the 
Pillage of a Continent (NYU Press, 1997). 
32 Smith, Talons of the Eagle, chap. 2. 
33 Stephen G. Rabe, The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America (Oxford 
University Press, 2016). 
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deployment to the Latin American AoR. This method allows for a cross comparison of 
visits within different countries while limiting variables by using the same ship and 
deployment. The most salient sources analyzed are Latin American newspaper articles, 
editorials, press releases, or analytical pieces covering the deployments and their respective 
port calls, followed by U.S. governmental press releases of the same focus. Other primary 
sources evaluated include reports and articles produced by the respective U.S. warship, 
host-nation naval component, SOUTHCOM, and any other sources with pertinent 
information or opinions related to the visits.  
a. Case Study Selection 
In order to find relevant cases for analysis, I searched within the U.S. Navy’s 
Lessons Learned Information System (unclassified version),34 which is regularly updated 
by the navigation officers of each U.S. naval ship and contains data on all of port visits the 
ship has completed. The two selected deployments stood out for the number of port calls 
the ship had conducted and the relatively recent timeframe in which they were executed. 
Essentially, ships on recent deployments to 4th Fleet usually do not visit more than a couple 
ports. Even when the deployments consist of more port calls, the visits are often brief stops 
for fuel, where the ship is only in-port for a few hours for re-supply. In this sense, the 
deployments of the AMERICA and GUNSTON HALL were distinct in that they each had 
at least three visits where the ship spent a significant amount of time in-port.  
USS AMERICA’s deployment to the Caribbean and South America offers an 
excellent case study for analyzing the effects of port visits on the region. A unique voyage, 
the AMERICA transited from its building shipyard in Pascagoula, Mississippi, to her 
eventual homeport in San Diego. The case study is exceptional due to the large number of 
ports called and the heightened publicity resulting from the deployment’s diplomatic 
undertones and objectives. The visits offer a sizable sample group for comparison and 
analysis. Countries visited include Cuba, Colombia, Brazil, Chile, and Peru. This sample 
 
34 “Navy Lessons Learned Information System,” U.S. Navy, accessed December 10, 2020, 
https://www.jllis.mil/navy. 
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group is reasonably varied, primarily geographically as the Caribbean, River Plate, 
Southern Cone, and Andean regions are all represented.  
The 2018 GUNSTON HALL deployment provides an interesting case for analyzing 
port visits of a more routine nature. As a regularly scheduled deployment in support of 
three multinational exercises, the case offers a compelling examination of how the bilateral 
diplomatic priorities of achieving influence compete with the theater-specific objectives of 
the overarching exercises. Countries visited include Cuba, Honduras, Trinidad and Tobago, 
and Colombia. The deployment’s concurrent exercises, including Southern Seas 2018, 
Southern Partnership Station 2018, and UNITAS 2018, lent to increased media coverage 
and a more extensive sampling of host-nation news sources.  
D. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The most significant finding of the research is not that the U.S. Navy is achieving 
influence, but that the U.S. can improve its approach to naval diplomacy in order to 
optimize the effects from the execution of port visits in Latin America. First and foremost, 
U.S. naval leaders and planners should recognize that each port visit offers excellent 
opportunities for achieving influence and soft power through the use of public diplomacy. 
One recommendation the study suggests is the inclusion, whenever possible, of in-port 
events that include interactions with host-nation media and press. These interactions allow 
U.S. naval leaders to shape the latent signaling and effects provided by ship’s presence, 
while host-nation news-cycles spread the influential messaging from the local port to the 
rest of the host country.  
In order to maximize the opportunities for attaining influence through host-nation 
news, naval leaders and planners should enlist the support of the relevant U.S. Embassy 
for each port call. This study finds that an embassy press release has outsize effects in 
generating host-nation publications that contain messaging beneficial to achieving positive 
effects within the host population.  
Another recommendation this study puts forward is to include events that match 
overarching U.S. security and diplomatic policy toward the relevant country. Influence 
13 
through diplomacy is optimized when actions match policy.35 It is because these events 
provide a tangibility to U.S. polices of support and commitment that they are able to bolster 
the favorability of opinions and views held by the host nationals toward the U.S.  
Finally, naval leaders and planners should recognize situations where influence 
attainment is suboptimal. One such situation is realized when theater-wide objectives are 
prioritized over bilateral diplomatic aims. Whenever possible, port visits should devote 
time and effort to both theater and bilateral objectives in order to avoid missed 
opportunities for achieving influence. Another situation suboptimal for influence is when 
larger concurrent events or exercises overshadow the port visit. In order to avoid missed 
opportunities, naval leaders should shape messaging to include the port visit’s diplomatic 
objectives along with those of the concurrent event.  
  
 
35 Nye, Jr., Soft Power, 111. 
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II. AMERICA VISITS THE AMERICAS, 2014 
The first case study involves analyzing the deployment of the amphibious landing 
ship, USS AMERICA (LHA-6), during its maiden voyage from the shipyard in Pascagoula, 
Mississippi, to its eventual homeport in San Diego, California. 
A. DEPLOYMENT BACKGROUND 
Though the overarching purpose of the AMERICA’s transit was to deliver the ship 
to Southern California, the primary objective of the deployment and associated port visits 
was entirely diplomatic. Upon the ship’s arrival to San Diego, the ship’s commanding 
officer, Capt. Robert Hall Jr. emphasized the transit’s diplomatic aspects when he stated, 
“from community service projects to meaningful exchanges with various countries, 
everyone on this journey has contributed to something much greater than the ship. They 
have contributed to the strong bond that exists between the U.S. Navy and navies 
throughout South America.”36 In this case, the diplomatic effects of the deployment were 
not latent byproducts of routine presence. Instead, U.S. naval leadership actively sought to 
use the deployment’s port visits to achieve soft power influence and strengthen 
partnerships  
The deployment presents a significant case study for analysis in determining the 
influence from port visits for several reasons. First, the voyage was genuinely unique as 
most U.S. naval ships shift homeport once or twice in their lifetimes. This is significant 
because as a homeport shift, the transit was devoid of military-related operations and 
objectives inherent to more routine deployments (e.g., next chapter’s GUNSTON HALL 
deployment). The result allows for a shift to a more diplomatically focused deployment 
and port visits.  
Second, the transit generated a high level of publicity in host-nation news cycles. 
The increased attention resulted from the immense military power represented by the 
 
36 Jennifer Vigil, “Brand New Assault Ship America Heads to San Diego Home,” Times of San 
Diego, September 10, 2014, https://timesofsandiego.com/military/2014/09/10/the-navys-uss-america-
heads-to-san-diego-monday/. 
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AMERICA, an aircraft-carrying warship whose size is amongst the world’s largest if you 
omit the United States’ own supercarriers.37 Additionally, AMERICA was the first 
produced ship of its class and the newest design of American large-deck amphibious ships 
since the Wasp-class launched in 1987.38 The ship’s namesake also aided in the increase 
of publicity as the deployment and the port visits within were headlined in newspapers and 
editorials with interesting catchphrases such as “America visits the Americas” or “América 
visita las Americas” in Spanish.39 
Ultimately, using the following framework, this chapter’s analysis proves 
AMERICA’s trip to South America successfully achieved diplomatic influence with the 
United States’ Latin American allies. 
B. FRAMEWORK 
On July 10, 2014, USS AMERICA left Pascagoula and arrived in her new homeport 
of San Diego two months later, on September 15. Unable to transit the Panama Canal due 
to size limitations, the AMERICA traveled south through the Strait of Magellan, which 
allowed for port visits in Cuba (Guantanamo Bay), Colombia, Brazil, Chile, and Peru.40 
For analysis, the visits have been broken up into two categories: the North Andean region 
comprised of Cartagena de Indias, Colombia and Callao, Peru, and the Southern Cone 
region, which includes Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and Valparaíso, Chile. This case study 
purposely excluded Guantanamo Bay’s port visit due to its status as an overseas U.S. 
military base and lack of contact with or influence on host-nation peoples.  
The analysis of each port visit begins with an examination of the U.S. and the host 
nation’s current relations regarding security cooperation, security assistance, and other 
areas of bilateral convergence like trade and academic exchange. After this analysis, an 
 
37 Alex Pape, Jane’s Fighting Ships 2019–2020 (London, U.K.: Jane’s Information Group, 2019). 
38 “Navy to Commission Amphibious Assault Ship America,” U.S. Department of Defense, October 
10, 2014, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/605218/navy-to-commission-
amphibious-assault-ship-america/. 
39 “Future USS America Arrives in San Diego,” U.S. Pacific Fleet Public Affairs, September 15, 
2014, https://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/lha6/Pages/FutureUSSAmericatoArriveinSanDiego.aspx. 
40 U.S. Pacific Fleet Public Affairs. 
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examination will follow that details the considerations of conducting naval diplomacy in 
that particular host nation based on the previously analyzed relationship. The research 
concludes with a comparison between U.S. governmental press releases (military included) 
and local news publications covering the port visit to identify whether or not U.S. 
diplomatic messaging is being reflected and pushed by local news sources. 
C. ANALYSIS 
1. North Andean Region—Cartagena de Indias, Colombia 
The AMERICA anchored off the coast of Cartagena de Indias on July 17, 2014 for 
a two-day port call. 
a. U.S. Relations with Colombia 
The foundation of the modern U.S.–Colombia relationship has been the security 
cooperation policies, namely Plan Colombia, that have been implemented by the two 
nations to fight narcotrafficking, violent insurgents, and transnational criminal 
organizations (TCOs) within Colombia’s borders.41 Plan Colombia started in 1996 as an 
$860 million aid package that targeted the production of cocaine within Colombia by 
strengthening the country’s security institutions, particularly the military and police. The 
package included military equipment that ranged from helicopters to signal exploitation 
devices, expert instruction on using the new equipment, and training on counternarcotic 
tactics.42 Plan Colombia initiated an extensive U.S.–Colombia aid program that has 
continued to the present day and included several subsequent packages that expanded on 
the original focus of counternarcotics to include both counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorism. The expansion into these other mission areas transpired because of the 
U.S. shift toward counterterrorism that occurred post 9/11 and the government of 
 
41 Rex A Hudson, Colombia: A Country Study, Fifth, Area Handbook Series (Washington, DC: 
Library of Congress, 2010), 344. 
42 Hudson, 344. 
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Colombia’s revitalized push against the longtime insurgent and terrorist threat posed by 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).43  
These massive security cooperation operations and security sector assistance (SSA) 
packages brought the U.S. and Colombia’s militaries and governments closer together in 
their shared pursuit of regional stability by targeting criminal and insurgent organizations’ 
operations and limiting the number of illicit goods making their way to the U.S. border.44 
Though security cooperation was the primary basis for the U.S.–Colombian partnership 
initially, the two nations developed strong trade linkages as stability in Colombia grew, 
and U.S. investors were more comfortable pursuing opportunities in the Colombian 
markets. This enhanced trade relationship resulted in the signing of the 2012 U.S.–
Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, which drastically improved the trade status 
between the two countries as the new arrangement eliminated several tariffs indefinitely.45 
The economic relations have grown to the point that the U.S. is currently Colombia’s 
largest trading partner for imports and exports.46 Meanwhile, Colombia is the United 
States’ third-largest partner for imports and fourth for exports in the Latin American 
region.47  
The U.S. views Colombia as a security and stability re-exporter for the Latin 
American region. This role stems from the 2012 bilateral Action Plan on Regional Security 
Cooperation, which “focuses on capacity building for security personnel in Central 
America and the Caribbean by Colombian security forces” and addresses “hemispheric 
challenges, such as combating transnational organized crime, bolstering counternarcotics, 
 
43 Hudson, 345. 
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46 “Colombia Trade Summary,” World Integrated Trade Solution, accessed January 8, 2021, 
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47 “United States Trade Summary,” World Integrated Trade Solution, accessed January 8, 2021, 
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strengthening institutions, and fostering resilient communities.”48 Essentially, the U.S.–
trained Colombian forces use their experiences and resources to train other partners in the 
surrounding, allowing the U.S. to limit capacity-building involvement in the region.  
b. U.S. Naval Diplomacy in Colombia 
Security cooperation relationships between the U.S. and the host nations in this 
study generally fall into one of two categories: capacity-building focused, or 
interoperability focused. U.S. security cooperation with smaller countries with limited 
security capabilities or military force, think Central America or West Indies, have their 
basis in capacity-building. U.S. security cooperation with larger countries with more 
substantial military capacity, e.g., Brazil or Mexico, centers on achieving interoperability. 
Security cooperation in Colombia is an interesting case because it bridges the gap between 
these two classifications. Even though capacity-building was the basis of U.S.–Colombian 
security cooperation, Colombian security force capabilities have achieved a high enough 
level for interoperability-focused integration with the U.S. Why is the distinction within 
this dichotomy relevant? Soft-power influence and public diplomacy function best when 
diplomatic messaging and events match the overall strategic policy toward the host 
nation.49 Since Colombia fits both categories, U.S. naval diplomacy directed toward 
Colombia can focus either on capacity-building or interoperability and still achieve 
influence effectively.  
U.S. interests in Colombia involve maintaining stability for economic and security-
related purposes, building partner capacity and interoperability, and eliminating the threat 
of drug trafficking and transnational crime. How exactly do U.S. warship visits to 
Colombia fit these policy objectives? Like AMERICA’s visit to Cartagena, port visits 
supplement these policies by providing a highly publicized show of commitment, 
partnership, and reassurance to the host nation’s government and populace. For this reason, 
naval stops in Colombia fit mainly within the amity-seeking category of the Rowlands 
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framework. This categorization makes sense because U.S. naval diplomacy in the country 
centers on “support to allies, the building of relationships, coalitions, partnerships and the 
spread of goodwill.50  
c. Analysis on U.S. Actions in Cartagena de Indias, U.S. Press Releases, and 
Colombian News Sources 
The AMERICA’s visit to Cartagena involved two significant events concerning 
diplomacy. The first was a key leader engagement (KLE) and press conference that 
included General John Kelly, commander of SOUTHCOM, Kevin Whitaker, the U.S. 
Ambassador to Colombia, and Juan Carlos Pinzón, the Colombian Defense Minister.51 
This type of event is a useful tool in achieving soft-power influence because it allows U.S. 
leaders to shape the latent signaling of the ship’s presence and properly message the 
purpose of the visit, which is critical to eliminating any misinterpretation by the host nation.  
The second was a joint training exercise and exchange between the AMERICA’s 
marine contingent and the Colombian marines in nearby Covenas. The subject matter 
focused on aspects of counternarcotics, which, as noted previously, is the central tenet of 
U.S.–Colombian security cooperation.52 Therefore, this event and the resulting news 
coverage were optimal for achieving influence because they matched the overarching U.S. 
security policy toward Colombia. 
The overriding message contained in many of the U.S. publications that covered 
AMERICA’s stop in Cartagena was that the visit presented an opportunity to build upon 
the U.S.–Colombian security relationship. This signaling is apparent in John Scorza’s 
article, which quoted U.S. Marine Captain Blaine Barby as stating, “the main purpose for 
the visit was to continue to develop the relationship between the Infanteria de Marina 
(Colombian Marines) and the U.S. Marine Corps,” and that “Colombia is a significant 
 
50 Rowlands, Naval Diplomacy in 21st Century, 21. 
51 “El último buque de guerra de EEUU inicia en Cartagena su gira latinoamericana,” el Economista, 
July 18, 2014, https://www.eleconomistaamerica.com/politica-eAm/noticias/5950024/07/14/El-ultimo-
buque-de-guerra-de-EEUU-inicia-en-Cartagena-su-gira-latinoamericana.html. 
52 John Scorza, “America Marines Help Combat Colombia IED Threat,” United States Navy Public 
Affairs, July 22, 2104, https://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/lha6/Pages/
AmericaMarinesHelpCombatColombiaIEDThreat.aspx. 
21 
partner in our counternarcotics operations.”53 This message highlights U.S.–Colombian 
security cooperation policy when it mentions counternarcotics and is amity-seeking in 
depicting cooperation between the U.S. and Colombian Marines.  
This same message surfaced in Colombian articles, like Estefany Gomez 
Solórzano’s, which states, “Colombia seeks to continue strengthening its relations with the 
United States and other nations to fight against common threats, drug trafficking, terrorism, 
arms trafficking, and money laundering.”54 Another host-nation article by El Universal 
describes the visit’s purpose as “carrying out tactical exercises that will reinforce the 
relations of friendship and mutual cooperation between the two navies.”55 The amity-
seeking signaling, present in both U.S. and Colombian publications, emphasized U.S. 
security policy and commitment toward Colombia and met Charles Allen’s definition of a 
show of resolve, “the purpose of which is to signal a commitment to a friend.”56  
2. North Andean Region—Callao, Peru 
The AMERICA anchored off the coast of Callao on August 31, 2014 for a three-
day port call. 
a. U.S. Relations with Peru 
As another country in the North Andes, Peru shares many similarities with 
Colombia in its relationship with the U.S. A U.S.–led crackdown on coca production in 
Colombia has pushed coca-growing operations into the Peruvian Andes.57 Thus, 
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countering narcotraffickers and the criminal organizations that accompany the drug trade 
is a dominant point of bilateral security cooperation and SSA between the two countries, 
though nowhere near the levels seen in Colombia. To illustrate the difference, last year, the 
U.S. Department of State (DoS) provided Peru just $51 million under its International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement program,58 which is significantly less than the $267 
million it gave to Colombia that same year.59 Even though the bilateral cooperation on 
countering narcotics production and trafficking is not as robust as Colombia’s, the U.S.–
Peruvian relationship is in some ways more diverse as the two nations work together on a 
multitude of other programs that build Peruvian governmental institutions, collaborate on 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, and counter criminal activities that 
fall outside counternarcotics, like human trafficking.60 From a more historical perspective, 
the U.S. and Peru share a longstanding tradition of naval exchange, cooperation, and even 
diplomacy.61  
The U.S. and Peru share strong economic linkages, especially since the signing of 
the United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, which improved the trade relationship 
so much that two-way trade has nearly doubled in the last ten years.62 The U.S. is second 
only to China as Peru’s largest importer and exporter of goods.63 Although bilateral trade 
is not as robust as the U.S.–Colombia partnership, Peru’s economic and political stability 
remains a priority to U.S. interests. The U.S. seeks to expand upon the current trade 
situation that currently maintains a $3.5 billion trade surplus in the U.S. favor.64 
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b. U.S. Naval Diplomacy in Peru 
As another partner state in the North Andean region, U.S. naval diplomacy 
objectives in Peru are similar to those in Colombia, with some key differences. Using port 
visits like the AMERICA’s in Callao, the U.S. sought to bolster its security cooperation 
operations and SSA with publicized events that send a message of dependability, 
trustworthiness, strength, and presence to the Peruvian government and public. In this 
sense, the diplomacy sought based upon the bilateral relationship falls squarely in Kevin 
Rowlands’ definition of amity-seeking preventative diplomacy, which he describes as 
“building relationships with an eye to the future, building capacity in allies and friends, 
and building on the influence wrought through other instruments of policy.”65 Like 
Colombia, U.S. security cooperation with Peru fulfills both capacity-building and 
interoperability objectives, though the preponderance is on the former.  
When considering naval diplomacy, the primary difference between Peru and 
Colombia is that the U.S.–Peruvian relationship is simply not as strong or integrated, which 
is reflected in the opinions of the Peruvian citizenry. A 2017 Latinobarómetro polling 
report showed that only 71% of Peru’s citizenry viewed Peru’s relationship with the U.S. 
favorably. In contrast, the same question garnered 83% favorable views in Colombia (tied 
for the highest in Latin America).66 Though this weaker relationship may at first seem to 
be a detractor from naval diplomacy, the opposite is more likely to be true when 
considering that weakness actually provides a more meaningful opportunity to achieve 
influence. L.W. Martin best explained this dynamic when he observed that friendly, benign, 
and routine port visits do not provide as great of potential for effect as those that occur in 
situations with more political tension.67 Essentially if the Peruvian bilateral relationship 
was more robust and the public had a significantly high opinion of the U.S., there would 
be little left to gain through naval diplomacy.  
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66 Corporación Latinobarómetro, La Era de Trump: Imagen de Estados Unidos en América Latina 
(Santiago, Chile: Corporación Latinobarómetro, 2017), https://www.latinobarometro.org/
latNewsShowMore.jsp. 
67 Martin, The Sea in Modern Strategy, 141. 
24 
c. Analysis on U.S. Actions in Callao, U.S. Press Releases, and Peruvian 
News Sources 
During AMERICA’s port call in Callao, the crew executed two events specifically 
for diplomatic effect. The first was a reception hosted aboard for Peruvian leaders and 
dignitaries that included a joint press conference.68 These affairs are excellent 
opportunities to achieve influence with the host nation’s decision-making elite. The face-
to-face exchanges inherent to a reception allow for the development of lasting personal 
relationships, which is a crucial dimension of Joseph Nye’s public diplomacy concept.69 
The press conference successfully provided an environment for achieving influence due to 
its involvement of the same message-shaping as observed in the Colombian case.  
The other significant diplomatic event was a humanitarian and disaster relief 
exercise between the U.S. and Peruvian marines, which included bi-lateral exchanges on 
medical aid and explosive ordnance disposal.70 The joint training matched the overarching 
U.S. security policy in Peru at the time as both countries had agreed two years prior that 
cooperation would center on “humanitarian assistance, such as joint disaster response 
training,” in addition to counternarcotics.71 The inclusion of the humanitarian exercise in 
the port visit allowed the U.S. to highlight the underlying policies upon which U.S.–
Peruvian security cooperation is built.  
As expected from an amity-seeking port visit, the consistent message within U.S. 
press releases was increased naval interoperability and consolidating the relationship 
between the two nations. Many of these articles conferred this message with the words of 
top dignitaries present during the visit, like the Diálogo article which quoted the 
Commander of SOUTHCOM, General John F. Kelly with, “the name of Peru always 
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appears in the first places,” when the U.S. considers its closest allies and partners.72 
Another example is Donald Holbert’s article, which quoted the Commander of 
Expeditionary Strike Group 3, Admiral Frank Ponds, with, “to celebrate our last and final 
port visit, I can think of no other place we would rather spend it at than here, in Peru. Most 
people see our countries as being separated by water, but for me, it signifies what joins us 
together.”73 Charles Allen contends that there is a fair amount of messaging that takes 
place during a port visit just by the presence of a foreign warship.74 In this case, however, 
we see that same message manipulated with rhetoric by high-ranking U.S. military 
diplomats to ensure that the signaling of friendship and cooperation is relayed to the 
Peruvian public.  
Same message was reflected in Peruvian press publications, with quotes of both 
U.S. and Peruvian officers prevalent throughout the news cycle. For example, RPP 
Noticias quoted the Commander General of the Peruvian Marines, General Carlos Tejada, 
with, “what we seek is to achieve interoperability in the matter of communications and 
procedures to follow with our friends in the U.S. Navy.”75Alonso Marín’s article on the 
visit provides another example with its quote of the Peruvian Defense Minister, Pedro 
Cateriano, who said, “this visit ratifies the bilateral relations between our two countries. 
We are working together in aspects of collaboration in defense and security to improve on 
both with our country.”76  
Through these publications, the influence that Allen contends is realized by warship 
presence is amplified and pushed throughout Peru as every citizen with newspaper or 
internet access can see the message of cooperation and U.S. support to Peru highlighted in 
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this rhetoric of American and Peruvian diplomats. This phenomenon is essential to the U.S. 
soft power influence in a country where the opinions and views of the U.S. are not as high 
as others.  
3. Southern Cone Region—Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 
The AMERICA moored to the Maua Wharf in Rio de Janeiro on August 5, 2014 
for a four-day port call. 
a. U.S. Relations with Brazil 
As multi-ethnic and young democracies, the U.S.–Brazil relationship has always 
had the potential to become a great partnership. Instead, frustrating miscommunication, 
faulty assumptions, and missed opportunities have hamstrung the alliance’s 
consolidation.77 Despite this dynamic, relations have grown relatively secure in recent 
years, especially when considering security cooperation and economic ties. This 
consolidation in bilateral relations culminated in the 2011 signing of the Agreement on 
Trade and Economic Cooperation, which vastly improved the state of bilateral trade and 
investment between the western hemisphere’s two largest economies,78 and the 2019 U.S. 
declaration of Brazil as a Major Non-NATO Ally due to the increase in a shared 
commitment to security cooperation.79  
According to Peter Meyer, a Western Hemisphere policy analyst, in his report to 
Congress, the increased security cooperation between the U.S. and Brazil has coalesced 
into three separate areas: counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and general defense.80 
Though Brazil is not a significant producer of drugs, cocaine consumption has increased 
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to the point that Brazil has become one of the world’s top consumers and a hub for drugs 
destined for Europe.  
An escalation in drug-trafficking and other criminal activity accompanied this 
increase in consumption, which researchers have primarily attributed to Brazil’s rising 
TCOs.81 As for counterterrorism, most of the cooperation concentrates on U.S. training to 
Brazil’s security forces to strengthen their capabilities while concurrently sharing 
intelligence on suspected terrorist activity in Brazil.82 The last category, defense, is 
comprised of the cooperation that stems from the 2010 signing of the U.S.–Brazil Defense 
Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that stipulated areas for working together, which included 
research and development, international peacekeeping, and joint military exercises, 
amongst others.83 
b. U.S. Naval Diplomacy in Brazil 
U.S. naval diplomacy in Brazil falls definitively in the amity-seeking category. As 
evidence, the previously mentioned DCA specifically designated ship visits as a primary 
security cooperation area between both nations’ armed forces.84 While it may meet the 
shared objectives in this military-specific context, actually achieving influence amongst 
Brazilian lawmakers and the Brazilian public provides a separate challenge. Efforts to 
achieve soft power in Brazil through naval diplomacy must contend with the historical 
frustrations that had kept the two nations at arm’s length, the most recent of which occurred 
when reports surfaced in 2015 that the NSA had allegedly been spying on top Brazilian 
officials.85 As a result of the recent setbacks in relations, only 67% of Brazilians view the 
United States favorably and even less qualify the U.S.–Brazilian relationship as a positive 
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one (62%).86 As seen in the Peruvian case, these statistics are counterintuitive in that they 
provide a better environment for naval diplomacy, which can be a useful tool in influencing 
the opinions and views of the Brazilian citizenry.  
As mentioned previously, Brazil is similar to the Northern Andean cases because 
the type of diplomacy sought is amity-seeking; however, Brazil provides a significantly 
different environment for achieving influence, especially when it comes to messaging. The 
primary difference that separates Brazil from the rest of the countries within this case study 
is the relative strength of both the Brazilian economy and its armed forces. Brazil is the 
world’s ninth largest economy87 and the western hemisphere’s largest military outside of 
the United States.88 Therefore, the priority for U.S. objectives in Brazil are increasing joint 
coordination to counter shared threats, responding to natural disasters, and aiding in 
humanitarian relief situations; in other words, Brazil falls entirely within the 
interoperability category, whereas the North Andean countries include elements of 
capacity-building. As evidence, the DOD gave less than $1 million in SSA to Brazil in 
2019, a small fraction of what the U.S. gave to Colombia and Peru.89 Additionally, the 
U.S. seeks to increase U.S.–Brazilian interoperability through foreign military sales, in 
large part because the Brazilian government can afford to purchase U.S. equipment.90 
Considering the U.S.–Brazil dynamic, the most successful approach to naval 
diplomacy is likely one of allied and equal partnership and not as a supplement to its SSA 
policy as seen in the previous cases. The diplomacy should still confer trust in American 
commitment and strength but more from an equal perspective that respects Brazil’s 
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leadership position as the regional hegemon of South America. The likelihood of success 
is high with this type of messaging that considers Brazil’s continued search for 
international validation, which is illustrated best by its longtime pursuit of a permanent seat 
on the UN Security Council.91  
c. Analysis on U.S. Actions in Rio de Janeiro, U.S. Press Releases, and 
Brazilian News Sources 
Like the Peruvian case, the port call in Rio de Janeiro included a reception onboard 
for Brazilian diplomats and dignitaries92 and a joint security cooperation exercise between 
the U.S. Marines and their Brazilian counterparts at Marambaia Island.93 The reception 
allowed U.S. leadership to shape the port visit’s narrative to match the United States’ 
overall policy toward Brazil through face-to-face interactions and an included press 
conference. Admiral Ponds, the commander of Expeditionary Strike Group 3, took 
advantage of this opportunity when he told reporters that “these exchanges have relevance, 
and they have reason; they make us more interoperable and meant to work together if and 
when the time comes.”94 The keyword in Ponds’ statement is interoperable, which, as 
previously mentioned, is the focal point of U.S.–Brazilian cooperation. Also included in 
the reception were static displays of U.S. naval equipment,95 an addition that highlights 
the foreign military sales aspects of U.S.–Brazilian relations.  
The Marambaia exercise showcased cooperation and interoperability between U.S. 
and Brazilian forces as they executed “bi-lateral exchanges on combat marksmanship, 
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improvised explosive device detection, medical treatment, and combat tracking.”96 
Critically, the exercise had no capacity-building elements but instead focused on exchanges 
of information and force integration. This type of event is suited for Brazil because it 
considers both Brazilian nationalism and Brazil’s desire for recognition as an equal partner 
in relations with the U.S.  
The main message concerning naval diplomacy in the majority of U.S. press 
releases on the Rio de Janeiro visit was that the purpose of AMERICA’s stop in Brazil was 
to strengthen the bilateral partnership between the two countries. This signaling is apparent 
in the Diálogo article, which reports that the AMERICA’s visit “represented the brotherly 
union of two important countries, whose navies’ stabilization actions are important within 
the regional context.”97 The U.S. Embassy’s press release also highlighted the partnership 
when it explained that the visit “reinforces the importance of military cooperation in the 
region by promoting and strengthening partnerships and integrated operations between the 
navies of the two countries.”98 Considering the previous analysis on naval diplomacy in 
Brazil, these publications hit the mark for adequately conveying a message of joint 
cooperation in the context of interoperability and an equal security partnership.  
The Brazilian publications covering the AMERICA’s visit conveyed the same 
sentiment of cooperation and strengthening security ties to the Brazilian public. An article 
published by Estratégia Global focused explicitly on the opportunities presented by the 
visit for the U.S. Marines and their Brazilian counterparts to work together. It noted that 
the visit “reinforces the partnership between the Marine Corps of the two countries, 
contributes to increased interoperability, and strengthens ties between the military 
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forces.”99 In a similar vein, an article by Exame stated that the visit “aims to strengthen the 
partnership between the Brazilian and U.S. navies in order to improve maritime security 
and humanitarian aid.”100 In the context of recent U.S.–Brazil relations, the message 
contained within these Brazilian publications met U.S. diplomatic objectives because they 
portrayed the U.S. as a trustworthy ally who respects Brazil and its armed forces as equal 
partners in ensuring stability in the western hemisphere. Though some of these publications 
report specifically on material concerning defense, like Estratégia Global, others that 
included coverage of the port call are major Brazilian media outlets with a wide distribution 
throughout Brazil, like Exame101 and Globo.102 This is an important distinction because it 
indicates that the Brazilian public is receiving the message and not just the defense 
community.  
4. Southern Cone Region—Valparaíso, Chile 
The AMERICA moored to berth 4 of the South Pacific Terminal in Valparaíso for 
a three-day port call. 
a. U.S. Relations with Chile 
The U.S.–Chile security partnership is reasonably robust and has strengthened over 
the past three decades since Chile transitioned back to democracy from the bureaucratic 
authoritarianism of the Pinochet regime that had led the country since the 1973 Allende 
Coup. The current relationship stems from multiple defense cooperation agreements and 
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over two decades’ worth of annual joint training exercises and operations.103 Unlike the 
other three cases in this study, counternarcotics is not a significant point of cooperation; 
the partnership is focused more on mission sets that include the sharing of intelligence, 
peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.104 Interestingly, the U.S. gives 
almost nothing to Chile in SSA,105 another point of departure from the other cases in this 
study. However, military sales are conducted regularly between the two countries.106 
Within the western hemisphere, Chile ranks amongst the top trade partners of the 
U.S. Trade between the two nations has flourished since the signing of the 2001 U.S.–Chile 
Free Trade Agreement, eliminating many tariffs and other policy barriers to bilateral 
trade.107 In 2019, the U.S. was Chile’s second-largest exporter and importer behind 
China;108 within the Latin American region, Chile was the fourth largest importer of U.S. 
goods and the third-largest exporter of goods to the United States.109 Outside of security 
and trade, the two nations exchange information and coordinate in environmental 
protection, science and technology, and education while also working together to advance 
developmental projects in other countries.110  
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b. U.S. Naval Diplomacy in Chile 
Along the same lines as Brazil, modern U.S. naval diplomacy conducted in Chile 
falls wholly within the amity-seeking category. The objective of port visits by U.S. 
warships in Chilean ports is to build upon security partnerships while at the same time 
expanding U.S. soft power and influence within the Chilean government and public to 
maintain the mutually beneficial trade and security relationship. Despite the strong 
relations shared between the two governments, achieving influence and soft power within 
Chile is not without its challenges. As of 2017, only 67% of the Chilean public had positive 
views of the United States; interestingly, a significantly higher percentage (73%) viewed 
the U.S.–Chilean relationship as a favorable one.111 Continued Chilean distrust of the U.S. 
likely explains this dynamic, which stems from the U.S. support of the 1973 coup and the 
bureaucratic authoritarian regime that took power, a regime recognizable for its extensive 
state terror programs and human rights violations.  
Considering these opinion demographics, naval diplomacy in Chile would be most 
effective in targeting the Chilean public’s views and opinions. The messaging of 
AMERICA’s visit to Valparaíso should focus on U.S. strength and trustworthiness as both 
an ally and trade partner. Within Ken Booth’s framework, the U.S. objectives in Chile 
centered on gaining national prestige, an idea that places incredible importance on how our 
partners view us.112 Essentially, the more prestige the U.S. has in the Chilean public’s 
eyes, the better equipped U.S. diplomats are to ensure negotiations on bilateral 
commitments and policies are mutually beneficial to both states. As a foreign policy tool, 
the AMERICA is exceptionally well equipped to achieve this prestige as a powerful 
warship and symbol of American strength and commitment to the Chilean partnership.  
Much like the relationship with Brazil, the basis of U.S.–Chilean security 
cooperation is interoperability, not capacity-building. Chilean military power is relatively 
robust for the region, and its armed forces are more suited for integration with the U.S. in 
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operations like disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. Also, as observed in Brazil, 
foreign military sales substitute for SSA within the U.S.–Chile relationship.113  
c. Analysis on U.S. Actions in Valparaíso, U.S. Press Releases, and Chilean 
News Sources  
The AMERICA’s crew executed two diplomatic events during their time in-port 
Valparaíso. The first was a reception onboard for ranking officials in the Chilean Navy and 
local dignitaries. As witnessed in the previous two cases, events like these are incredible 
opportunities for establishing the interpersonal relationships vital to a successful public 
diplomacy campaign. Cultural exchange was a consistent theme of the messaging 
surrounding both the visit and the reception.114 This cultural element’s inclusion is 
noteworthy because a nation’s way of life and its attractiveness to others are key 
components of soft-power influence.115  
The other diplomatic event was a community relations event (COMREL) in which 
U.S. and Chilean sailors worked together to restore the local Arturo Prat Children’s 
Home.116 Community relations projects like this one in Valparaíso are excellent 
opportunities to influence the local population through face-to-face public diplomacy while 
simultaneously boosting U.S. prestige, as the event displayed U.S. goodwill toward the 
Chilean public.  
The visit of AMERICA to Valparaíso provides a unique case when examining the 
news coverage surrounding the event. Most of the Chilean articles give direct quotes to the 
U.S. Embassy’s press release concerning the visit. The most consistently quoted piece of 
the release is one that focused on the close cooperation between the U.S. and Chilean 
navies, as seen here: 
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This visit by USS America is an example that shows the close relationship 
and mutual trust that the naval forces of both countries have developed over 
the years. Chile and the United States have worked as strategic partners 
jointly and with increasing frequency and effectiveness on a wide range of 
regional security issues, especially in humanitarian aid and disaster 
response training programs. In this regard, both Navies have expressed their 
interest in continuing to expand upon this collaboration.117 
Articles from prominent Chilean news sources, including Bío-Bío Chile,118 El 
Martutino,119 Soy Valparaíso,120 and El Mercurio,121 all contained this quote within their 
coverage of AMERICA’s visit. The teamwork exhibited here between the AMERICA and 
the Embassy in Santiago created an excellent atmosphere for achieving influence through 
soft power in Chile, as several of Chile’s big-name newspaper outlets extended the U.S. 
message of cooperation and partnership from Valparaíso to the rest of the country.  
Also of note is the inclusion of AMERICA’s warfighting characteristics in many of 
these same articles. This addition is noteworthy because it exhibits what Charles Allen calls 
“the language of force.”122 Essentially, the language of force is the latent signaling 
provided simply by the presence of naval power, which, when deployed abroad, is 
representative of a country’s interest in a specific region and the nations within.123 The 
more powerful the ship, the more latent signaling it produces. For illustration, an aircraft 
carrier has greater potential for influence than a patrol craft due to the relative naval power 
they represent. Along these lines, the cutting-edge and powerful AMERICA is an excellent 
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diplomatic tool when utilizing the language of force. When combined with U.S. rhetoric 
and intent of cooperation and partnership, these latent signals provided by naval strength 
increase the United States’ national prestige and, therefore, the ability to achieve influence 
within Chile.  
D. FINDINGS 
The port visits of AMERICA’s deployment to South America were effective in 
achieving diplomatic influence. Before summarizing the lesson learned from these visits’ 
actual execution, it is necessary to discuss the several factors inherent to the deployment 
itself that aided in AMERICA’s success. Starting with the deployment’s purpose, the 
AMERICA’s primary mission, other than reaching San Diego, was to promote goodwill 
and strengthen partnerships throughout the region. The exclusion of operational objectives 
allowed AMERICA’s crew to focus specifically on diplomacy. Other than the purpose, the 
ship is a sizeable aircraft-carrying capital ship that represents significant U.S. military 
power. This characteristic’s advantages are three-fold: it boosts publicity, intensifies latent 
diplomatic signaling, and offers an excellent venue for hosting receptions and KLE.  
While these inherent factors set the deployment up for success, the actual execution 
of the port visits was optimal for gaining influence. Starting with the events conducted 
while in-port, the crew’s actions and planned affairs exemplified overall U.S. security 
policy to the relevant host nation. Most of the port calls contained receptions and ship-tours 
for local decision-makers; these face-to-face interactions present excellent opportunities to 
achieve influence through public diplomacy. The embarked Marines’ security cooperation 
exercises matched capacity-building or interoperability policies and generally highlighted 
the primary mission-sets that the two countries prioritize within their security relationship.  
U.S. press releases were also beneficial in capturing influence, as they offered 
platforms for U.S. leaders, like Rear Admiral Ponds, to effectively convey U.S. intentions 
of strengthening partnerships and cooperation to the population and government of the host 
nation. Of particular note is the beneficial value of U.S. Embassy support through press 
release coverage to the port visits and the accompanying events. Every port call in this 
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study included press releases from the relevant U.S. Embassy, and in specific cases like 
Chile, these press releases generated significant press in host nation news cycles.  
Finally, and most important to this analysis, host nation news articles reflected the 
same amity-seeking signaling in U.S. publications and offered by U.S. naval leadership. 
This last point speaks to the AMERICA’s actual effectiveness in achieving influence in 
Colombia, Peru, Brazil, and Chile. 
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III. GUNSTON HALL’S 2018 SOUTHERN SEAS DEPLOYMENT 
Analysis of the port visits conducted during USS GUNSTON HALL’s (LSD 44) 
2018 deployment to the Caribbean comprises the second case study of this thesis. 
A. DEPLOYMENT BACKGROUND 
The deployment’s primary aim was to support and participate in three separate 
SOUTHCOM exercises: Southern Seas 2018 (SS18), Southern Partnership Station 2018 
(SPS18), and UNITAS 2018. According to SOUTHCOM press releases, the deployment’s 
port visits presented opportunities for security-focused training and multinational exchanges 
in addition to diplomatic opportunities outside of the military-related events to promote 
goodwill and cooperation between the host nations and the United States.124 
Before analyzing the port visits, a brief review of the supported exercises is necessary 
to understand the deployment’s contextual aspects. SS18 and SPS18 are annual 
SOUTHCOM exercises that are “focused on subject matter expert exchanges (SMEE) and 
building partner capacity with partner nation militaries and security forces in the Caribbean, 
Central, and South America.”125 Specific to the execution of SS18 was the embarkation of 
an international staff consisting of naval officers from Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia. This 
joint team’s objective was to improve multinational coordination across several different 
mission areas, including countertrafficking and humanitarian relief.126 UNITAS, Latin for 
unity, is longest-running joint naval exercise focused on improving coalition maritime 
surface tactics and interoperability between the western hemisphere’s blue-water navies.127 
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The 2018 iteration of UNITAS is the 59th occurrence of the exercise since its inception in 
1960.  
In determining the influence of port visits, the GUNSTON HALL deployment 
provides a great contrast to the last chapter’s analysis on AMERICA, particularly in the 
aspects of routineness, geography, and purpose. AMERICA’s deployment to South America 
was characteristically exceptional; the ship’s namesake, its reason for deploying (homeport 
shift), and status as first of its class and a capital ship all contributed to its uniqueness as a 
case study. In contrast, GUNSTON HALL conducted port visits under conditions that were 
more routine in nature. The GUNSTON HALL’s patrol was a regularly scheduled 4th Fleet 
deployment and involved three annually recurring exercises that are not unique by any 
means.  
Conversely, the AMERICA’s transit was to conduct a homeport shift, likely the only 
one of its time in service. The GUNSTON HALL is a Whidbey Island-class dock landing 
ship, which means it is neither the first of its class nor an aircraft-carrying capital ship like 
the AMERICA.128 The final factor that differentiates the two deployments is geography. 
The AMERICA’s deployment involved visits throughout South America while the 
GUNSTON HALL’s voyage and visits remained in the Caribbean. It is important to note 
that even though the GUNSTON HALL remained in the Caribbean, the deployment involved 
several opportunities for engagement with South American partners through the transit’s 
concurrent exercises that included participation from every Latin American region.  
B. FRAMEWORK 
The GUNSTON HALL’s SOUTHCOM deployment began with the ship’s departure 
from its homeport of Norfolk, Virginia, on June 18, 2018, and ended with its return to 
Norfolk three months later, on September 26.129 During the deployment, the ship made port 
visits to Cuba (Guantanamo Bay), Honduras (Roatán), Trinidad and Tobago (Port of Spain), 
and Colombia (Cartagena de Indias). Like the previous chapter, Cuba has been excluded 
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from the following analysis as Guantanamo Bay is an overseas U.S. military base. The study 
follows the same framework used in the previous chapter, which includes an examination of 
bilateral relations, U.S. naval diplomacy in the host nation, U.S. actions during the visits, and 
concludes with a cross comparison of U.S. press releases and host nation publications 
reported on the visits. Since the last chapter included analysis covering the U.S.–Colombian 
relationship and U.S. naval diplomacy within Colombia, those sections have been replaced 
by a brief review of what contextual factors differentiated the GUNSTON HALL’s visit from 
the AMERICA’s.  
C. ANALYSIS 
1. Roatán, Honduras 
On July 21st, 2018, the GUNSTON HALL anchored off the coast of Coxen Hole, 
Roatán for a four-day port call. 
a. U.S. Relations with Honduras 
Honduras is a longtime trade partner and an essential ally of the U.S. within the 
Central American region. The current U.S. approach to Honduras consists of a whole-of-
government effort that is “focused on strengthening democratic governance, including 
promoting human rights and the rule of law, enhancing economic prosperity, and improving 
the long-term security situation.”130 Honduras has been struggling with high governmental 
and finance corruption, violent crime, and economic poverty. These factors have led to 
general instability in the country, resulting in increased narcotics trafficking activity and 
large amounts of Honduran citizens fleeing the country in search of safety and better hopes 
of prosperity.131 Other than increasing the stability of an important trade partner, major U.S. 
concerns for Honduras involve limiting the number of trafficked drugs and other illicit goods 
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in the country and the number of Honduran citizens fleeing an extremely violent situation132 
to seek asylum or illegal entrance into the U.133  
In terms of security cooperation, the two nations have shared strong ties since the 
1980s when Honduras supported U.S. military staging and follow-on efforts against the 
Sandinista government in Nicaragua and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front 
(FMLN) in El Salvador.134 Since these operations, there has been a continuous U.S. troop 
presence in Honduras since 1983 at Soto Cano Air Base. Known as Joint Task Force-Bravo, 
the force’s goal is to provide advanced staging for counternarcotics and disaster relief 
operations in the Central American and Caribbean regions.135 
The central focus area of recent security cooperation efforts has been building 
Honduran security force capacity to ensure citizen safety and improve counternarcotics.136 
The prevalence of organized crime and gang activity has rendered the country a dangerous 
place to live with significant prevalence of violence and one of the world’s highest homicide 
rates.137 To aid Honduran security forces in their pursuit of violence limitation, USAID and 
DoS have implemented several community-based crime prevention programs and others that 
identify and oust corrupt police officers.138 As for counternarcotics, the DOD has given large 
amounts of aid to Honduran security forces in funding, equipment, and training to limit the 
flow of illicit goods and drugs through the country.139 In 2018, the same year of GUNSTON 
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HALL’s visit, the DOD gave over $10 million in aid to Honduras, which resulted in the arrest 
and conviction of several high-level drug traffickers.140  
Joint U.S.–Honduran security efforts are not without their criticisms, however, as 
reports of human rights abuses, extrajudicial killings, and corruption on behalf of Honduras’ 
security forces have surfaced since the 2009 coup.141 To make matter worse, especially for 
public diplomacy, the U.S. often appears complicit to this state violence due to the training 
and SSA support it provides to those forces.142 Any diplomatic effort from the U.S. has to 
contend with this dynamic. Despite this disadvantage to achieving diplomatic influence, 80% 
of Hondurans view the U.S. favorably as of 2017, and when compared with other Latin 
American countries, Honduras is tied for the highest in Central America.143  
b. U.S. Naval Diplomacy in Honduras 
Within the 2018 timeframe of GUNSTON HALL’s visit to Roatán, naval diplomacy 
within Honduras was characterized best by Luttwak’s concept of latent suasion in the 
supportive mode.144 Under this category, supportive-mode port visits are “a continuous 
reminder to allies and clients of the capabilities that can be brought to their aid” and “a 
tangible content to any prior commitments that may have been made.”145 The applicability 
of this type of suasion to Honduras is apparent when considering how U.S. warships in 
Honduran ports provide a tangibility of U.S. support to the Honduran government and public 
in their fight against the destabilizing forces that are debilitating their country. Any analysis 
on influence in this particular case must consider the geographical disparity between the 
island of Roatán and mainland Honduras. Although the visit’s exposure may be limited for 
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mainland Hondurans, news coverage of the visit has the ability to extend the influential 
effects from the island to the rest of the country.  
Using the last chapter’s analytical tool that categorized U.S. naval diplomacy into 
capacity-building or interoperability, security cooperation in 2018 Honduras fit entirely 
within the capacity-building category. As described previously, U.S. objectives in Honduras 
were to build security force capacity to limit violent crime, drug trafficking, and corruption. 
Honduras simply does not have the significant military or naval power that would lend to a 
more interoperative relationship, as seen in other Latin American countries like Brazil or 
Chile. U.S. actions and signaling concerning port visits to Honduras should note this 
distinction because, as Joseph Nye points out, matching policy to messaging optimizes the 
achievement of soft-power effects.146  
c. Analysis on U.S. Actions in Roatán, U.S. Press Releases, and Honduran 
News Sources 
The GUNSTON HALL’s visit to Roatán involved three significant events that 
provided opportunities to gain influence in Honduras. Those events included a KLE between 
GUNSTON HALL and Honduran Naval leaders, SMEE between members of the crew and 
armed forces of Honduras,147 and a COMREL where crewmembers helped a local 
philanthropy organization to build community housing.148 The KLE and SMEE events 
demonstrated the concept of latent suasion in the supportive mode as they exhibited 
continued U.S. support to prior agreements and the bilateral partnership. These exchange 
events met both diplomatic and military objectives, though the focus was mainly on the latter. 
The COMREL, on the other hand, was strictly diplomatic and provided an excellent 
opportunity to achieve soft power influence through the concept of public diplomacy, which 
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Joseph Nye argues can bolster a country’s attractive image with a foreign public through 
positive actions and exchanges.149 
Notably, none of the events focused explicitly on capacity-building; this is likely due 
to the exercises’ overarching objectives, which focused on integration in disaster relief type 
missions. As an expected consequence, neither U.S. nor Honduran coverage of the visit 
contained any capacity-building elements in their reporting. These omissions incur a 
significant mismatch between the visit’s messaging and the overarching U.S. security policy 
toward Honduras. The result is a suboptimal diplomatic message that cannot provide 
tangibility to U.S. SSA policy toward Honduras. Although the signaling may only partially 
match Honduras-specific diplomatic priorities, the events still met theater objectives for 
SOUTHCOM. The divergence between the Honduran bilateral agenda and theater-wide 
goals is expected, as port visits require a prioritization of events due to the limited time 
associated with the stops.  
U.S. press releases that reported on the KLE and SMEE events corresponded to a 
narrative of latent suasion in the supportive mode,150 with the coverage including elements 
of cooperation and integration. In an article by U.S. Navy Public Affairs Element East, 
Destroyer Squadron 40 Commodore Brian Diebold was quoted with, “our meeting served as 
a great opportunity for the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps to highlight our current 
missions with our partners in Central America,” and continued with “the Southern Seas 
deployment provides us opportunities such as this visit to discuss the future of multinational 
integration with the Honduran Navy.”151 Captain Diebold’s statements successfully 
highlighted the cooperative aspects of the GUNSTON HALL’s goodwill visit and are on 
message for achieving influence under the framework of supportive-type latent suasion. 
As for Honduran news sources, reports on the visit are quite sparse, and none 
specifically cover the KLE and SMEE events. One possible explanation for the coverage gap 
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is that warship visits to Honduran shores do not generate much press in the country’s news 
cycle. However, this notion is easily discounted by two other U.S. port visits to Honduras in 
2018 (USCGC EAGLE and USNS COMFORT) that generated several articles in the 
Honduran press.152 A more likely explanation is that the U.S. Embassy did not release an 
article on the visit’s security cooperation aspects.153 As observed in the AMERICA study, 
an embassy press release usually sparks several reports in the host nation press, which 
generally reflect the same messages of cooperation, support, prestige, and the like. The 
Embassy released articles for both the EAGLE and COMFORT visits, which likely explains 
their subsequent inclusion in the Honduran press.154 Because the Embassy did not provide 
a press release, the GUNSTON HALL’s visit was likely a missed opportunity to achieve 
influence as the Honduran press did not reflect the diplomatic messages found in the U.S. 
publications on the visit.  
One article in the Roatán press that covered the COMREL demonstrated how events 
that target public diplomacy could be successful in achieving influence. The article quoted 
the philanthropy coordinator with, “we are very grateful to the sailors because they have 
chosen to do their community service with us, and that fills us with great pride because we 
understand that investing in these projects is investing directly in the development of 
Roatán.”155 In this article, the public diplomatic message is the U.S. is committed to the 
development of Roatán. While this signaling was a diplomatic success for achieving 
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influence throughout the island of Roatán, it is unlikely that this event and its press had any 
influential effects on the Honduran mainland. The coverage was limited to one publication, 
Diario Roatán, which is a local newspaper whose readership does not extend much further 
than the bay islands.156 This is yet another instance where U.S. Embassy coverage would 
have aided in extending the message throughout the host nation.  
2. Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago 
The GUNSTON HALL moored to berth 5 of the Container Terminal in Port of Spain 
on August 8, 2018 for a three-day port call. 
a. U.S. Relations with Trinidad and Tobago 
The DoS describes U.S.–Trinbagonian relations as cordial,157 and the U.S. Embassy 
in Port of Spain lists U.S. interests in the Caribbean country as “increasing investment and 
trade, enhancing Trinidad and Tobago’s political and social development through crime 
prevention and youth programs, encouraging its positive regional role in the Caribbean 
Community and the Organization of American States, and strengthening the government’s 
capacity to deal with foreign terrorist fighters.”158 More recent concerns for the U.S. involve 
the humanitarian crisis in nearby Venezuela and the consolidation of the country’s relations 
with China. In regards to Venezuela, the U.S. seeks to ensure Trinidad and Tobago can 
handle the repercussions that stem from the crisis, which has resulted in tens of thousands of 
asylum seekers entering the country due to its nearby proximity (7 miles coast to coast).159  
As for China, Trinidad and Tobago was the first Caribbean state to sign on to the 
PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative and in recent years, the Chinese have undertaken numerous 
infrastructure projects throughout the islands, including the residence of the Trinbagonian 
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prime minister.160 In the defense sector, Trinidad and Tobago has bought Chinese-made 
offshore patrol crafts to supplement its coast guard.161 The U.S. seeks to limit this PRC 
influence in Trinidad and Tobago, and the region as a whole.162 
Recent security cooperation efforts between the U.S. and Trinidad and Tobago have 
emphasized bilateral counterterrorism efforts. In 2016, SOUTHCOM reported that 
Trinbagonians comprised the majority of ISIS foreign fighters originating from the 
Caribbean.163 In 2017, the U.S. aided Trinidad and Tobago in standing up a new 
counterterrorism task force by implementing a $6.3 million program that included 
counterterrorism-specific training and equipment.164 In 2018, the year of GUNSTON 
HALL’s visit, the DOD provided over three hundred thousand dollars under the International 
Military Education and Training Program and 165 thousand dollars for a program that 
specifically targets the enhancement of Trinbagonian counterterrorism capabilities.165 
Excluding counterterrorism, Trinidad and Tobago receives aid from the DoS’s Caribbean 
Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) program. CBSI is a program that enhances Trinbagonian 
security forces in their prosecution of crimes and the country’s maritime forces in their ability 
to provide port security and conduct maritime interception operations.166 
The U.S. shares close trade linkages with Trinidad and Tobago and is currently the 
Caribbean nation’s number one partner in imports and exports.167 Trinidad and Tobago has 
been the largest liquified natural gas supplier to the U.S. for several years. As a result, the 
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small Caribbean nation traditionally runs a trade surplus in its partnership with the United 
States.168 The mutually beneficial trade relationship stems from the 1984 Caribbean Basin 
Initiative and the 2001 Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act, policies that have eliminated 
tariffs and other trade barriers between the U.S. and its Caribbean partners.169  
b. U.S. Naval Diplomacy in Trinidad and Tobago 
The Trinbagonian case requires two separate frames of reference when analyzing 
U.S. naval diplomacy conducted within the country in the 2018 timeframe of GUNSTON 
HALL’s port visit to Port of Spain. The first, a more zoomed-in examination on Trinidad and 
Tobago itself, reveals many of the same analytical findings observed in the Honduran case. 
Like Honduras, Trinidad and Tobago matches Luttwak’s category of latent suasion in the 
supportive mode for a couple of reasons. The first is that U.S. naval diplomatic visits to 
Trinbagonian shores signal U.S. support and provide a tangibility and prestige to continued 
U.S. efforts to improve Trinbagonian counterterrorism capacity. The second reason is the 
general unlikelihood that any U.S. naval diplomatic actions conducted in the country would 
seek to compel or coerce Trinidad and Tobago’s government. However, it should be noted 
that by 2018, the Trinbagonians could have perceived latent signals of U.S. disapproval for 
their growing ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  
Like Honduras, capacity-building, not interoperability, defines the U.S.–
Trinbagonian security partnership. This categorization is due to the Trinbagonian military’s 
limited power and capability, which precludes meaningful integration with the United States’ 
much larger forces. Further evidence of this distinction resides in the large SSA packages 
provided to the country by the DOD.170 
The second frame of reference is taken from a wider aperture that includes nearby 
Venezuela and its ongoing socioeconomic, political, and humanitarian crisis. As Christian 
Le Mière notes, the same port visit can send distinct signals to multiple recipients, resulting 
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in different influential effects between the host nation and its neighbors.171 The argument 
here is that the GUNSTON HALL’s visit to Port of Spain was supportive to Trinidad and 
Tobago and, at the same time, coercive to Venezuela. At the time of the visit, the U.S. and 
Venezuela shared strained relations. Just a year prior, President Trump stated that he had not 
ruled out using the U.S. military to respond to the ongoing crisis.172 In May 2018, just 
months before the visit, the administration had implemented new sanctions against the 
Nicolás Maduro regime in response to its anti-democratic practices and human rights 
abuses.173 Considering the status of relations, the dynamic between the GUNSTON HALL’s 
visit to Port of Spain and Venezuela matches best with Luttwak’s category of active suasion 
in the compellence mode.174 Essentially, the GUNSTON HALL’s proximity to Venezuelan 
shores provided a tangible component to the threats and sanctions that comprised U.S. 
foreign policy toward Venezuela and the Maduro regime, even though the U.S. never listed 
any Venezuelan objectives for the port visit.  
c. Analysis on U.S. Actions in Port of Spain, U.S. Press Releases, and 
Trinbagonian News Sources 
During the three-day visit to Port of Spain, the GUNSTON HALL conducted KLE 
with top commanders in the Trinbagonian Coast Guard and SMEE between U.S. and 
Trinbagonian sailors. Both events focused specifically on improving dive and medical 
operations in support of counternarcotics and disaster relief missions.175  
Like the Honduran case, Trinidad and Tobago’s port visit involved a mismatch 
between U.S. policy and the events conducted while the ship was in-port. As noted 
previously, counterterrorism is the focal point of U.S.–Trinbagonian security cooperation, 
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yet none of the events included counterterror elements. The mismatch is likely the result of 
counterterrorism’s omission as an overarching objective of the SS18 and SPS18 
exercises.176 The exclusion of counterterrorism events was a missed opportunity to match 
U.S. policy to U.S. actions and likely hampered the achievement of soft-power influence. As 
observed in Roatán, this is not a necessarily a policy or planning failure; U.S. leaders are 
required and expected to balance bilateral diplomatic priorities with theater security 
objectives. Additionally, the actions conducted in-port are still likely to have gained some 
influence as they matched the U.S. regional security policy of strengthening partnerships and 
building partner capacity177 and presented the Trinbagonians with a message of U.S. amity, 
support, and commitment. 
The U.S. governmental press releases on the GUNSTON HALL visit highlighted 
joint cooperation between the GUNSTON HALL’s crew and the Trinbagonian Coast Guard 
and strengthening the relationship between both nations and their military forces. A press 
release from the U.S. Embassy in Port of Spain quoted the Chargé d’Affaires, John McIntyre 
with, “the SMEE is a demonstration of the continued, steadfast partnership between the U.S. 
and Trinidad and Tobago, which is characterized by trust and respect and based on our shared 
democratic values.”178 A press release by the SS18 public affairs team quoted the officer in 
charge of the medical SMEE, Lieutenant David Cruz, with, “the Fleet Health Engagement 
Team will conduct subject matter expert exchanges with military and civilian organizations 
to effectively share U.S. naval medicine’s best practices and lesson learned.179 The 
consistent sentiment across the press releases of cooperation, coordination, and training 
 
176 Hendricks, “Southern Seas 2018 Deployment Begins.” 
177 “SOUTHCOM Lines of Effort,” U.S. Southern Command, accessed February 7, 2021, 
https://www.southcom.mil/Lines-of-Effort/. 
178 “U.S. Navy to Conduct Subject Matter Expert Exchanges with T&T Coast Guard,” U.S. Embassy 
in Trinidad & Tobago, August 7, 2018, https://tt.usembassy.gov/u-s-navy-to-conduct-subject-matter-
expert-exchanges-with-tt-coast-guard/. 
179 “US Navy Dive, Medical Teams Begin Subject Matter Exchanges in Trinidad and Tobago,” 




matches the visit’s earlier categorization of latent suasion in the supportive mode and as a 
visit to build partner capacity. 
Unlike the previous cases examined within the AMERICA study, only a couple of 
Trinbagonian news sources reflected the U.S. sentiment of cooperation and coordination. 
One of those publications was a press release by Trinidad and Tobago’s government, which 
mentioned that the exercises conducted during the visit were “designed to enhance 
coordination in regional maritime activities and improve the operational readiness and 
interoperability of participants.”180 Regardless of the small amount of coverage in the 
Trinbagonian news cycle, articles like these still spread U.S. diplomatic signaling and 
influence to the rest of the government and population. 
A success in terms of U.S. soft power, one article in local news included coverage of 
a COMREL event where GUNSTON HALL sailors worked with Trinbagonian partners to 
refurbish a military cemetery in the Port of Spain district of St. James.181 Under Joseph 
Nye’s theory of public diplomacy, COMRELs, like this cemetery refurbishment, are 
symbolic events that generate strategic communication meant to enhance host-nation views 
and opinions toward the United States.182 
Other pieces, including Shane Superville’s in the national newspaper Newsday, were 
more skeptical of U.S. objectives within Trinidad and Tobago. In his article, Superville 
focused on whether or not the GUNSTON HALL’s presence in Trinidad in Tobago was 
actually directed toward Venezuela and its ongoing crisis and included quotes from the 
GUNSTON HALL’s commanding officer and the U.S. chargé d’affaires denying any such 
connection to Venezuela and the visit.183 The way the article is presented (facts-based, not 
opinion) and its title, “Not Here for Maduro,” have overtones of reassurance to a concerned 
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public that U.S. intentions are strictly limited toward the islands and not Venezuela. This 
article is fascinating as it connected the Port of Spain visit and U.S. policy concerns in 
Venezuela. Superville’s piece provides a great contrast to the amity-seeking cases in this 
thesis in its demonstration of how latent signals of coercion or compellence can be received 
and interpreted even if they are not sought or specifically called out as a policy objective.  
3. Cartagena de Indias, Colombia 
The GUNSTON HALL moored to quay 3 of the Cruise Terminal in Cartagena de 
Indias on August 27, 2018 for a week-long port visit.  
a. Colombia Review and Contextual Differences from the AMERICA’s Visit 
As a review from the last chapter, U.S.–Colombian relations are amongst the 
strongest in the region, buttressed by years of security cooperation and aid that targeted 
cocaine production and trafficking in the country.184 The U.S. views Colombia as a security 
re-exporter and the partnership as a vehicle to pursue U.S. policy goals throughout Latin 
America without direct involvement from the U.S. itself.185 U.S. naval diplomacy in 
Colombia seeks cooperation and builds Colombian security capacity, especially in 
counternarcotics and countering TCOs.186 U.S. port visits’ public diplomacy aspects 
reinforce positive views of U.S. prestige and support within the Colombian government and 
public, where opinions on the U.S. are amongst the highest in the region.187  
This chapter’s introduction covered the overarching differences between the 
GUNSTON HALL’s deployment and the AMERICA’s. However, when narrowing the 
analysis to strictly observe the aspects concerning both ships’ visits to Cartagena, one 
primary difference stands out: each visit’s purpose. 
Starting with the AMERICA, the goal of the port visit was the visit itself. In other 
words, the objective of AMERICA’s stop in Cartagena was to achieve diplomatic effects, 
 
184 Hudson, Colombia: A Country Study. 
185 Beittel, “Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations,” 24. 
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and the primary vehicle for achieving those effects was the physical presence of the ship. On 
the other hand, the goal of GUNSTON HALL’s visit was not the visit itself, but instead the 
concurrent naval exercise, UNITAS 2018. Essentially, AMERICA’s primary purpose was 
more geared toward diplomacy, whereas the GUNSTON HALL’s focused mainly on 
security cooperation. This distinction is analytically essential because, as L.W. Martin notes, 
a difference in context between visits can significantly influence the effects achieved from 
their execution.188 
b. Analysis on U.S. Actions in Cartagena de Indias, U.S. Press Releases, and 
Colombian News Sources 
U.S. actions while in-port Cartagena revolved around the execution of exercises 
SPS18 and UNITAS 2018. SPS18 involved a medical SMEE between U.S. and Colombian 
military medical professionals.189 On the other hand, the UNITAS exercise included 
planning events for the at-sea portion of the operation executed in Caribbean waters after the 
port visit.190 In the dichotomy of capacity-building versus interoperability, these events 
focused heavily on the latter. Though the core of U.S.–Colombian security collaboration is 
building counternarcotics capacity,191 these events still managed to meet U.S. policy toward 
Colombia and the region. The policy matched because Colombia maintains the military 
strength necessary to integrate into U.S. operations. Therefore, U.S. naval diplomatic 
objectives in the country pursue both capacity-building and interoperability, even if the 
former is the primary focus.  
The GUNSTON HALL’s port visit was significantly overshadowed in U.S. and 
Colombian news sources by the visit’s concurrent exercises, particularly UNITAS. Most 
articles only briefly mentioned the stop in Cartagena, while details of the exercises were 
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featured more prominently.192 Returning to the AMERICA comparison, the press’ focus on 
the exercises resulted from the non-diplomatic, military purpose of the GUNSTON HALL’s 
visit. While this may be detrimental to the visit’s ability to achieve influence, it is important 
to note that naval exercises, like UNITAS, are subsets of naval diplomacy and, therefore, can 
also achieve influence. However, the diplomatic influence achieved through naval exercises 
falls outside the purview of this study. 
Like the Honduran case, the U.S. Embassy’s lack of a press release also detracted 
from the influence achieved from GUNSTON HALL’s visit to Cartagena.193 The U.S. 
Embassy in Bogotá maintains an archive online of past press releases dating back to 2014. If 
this collection is comprehensive, then both the GUSTON HALL’s visit and the broader 
UNITAS exercise managed to go unmentioned. Instead, the three listed releases for the 
month of September 2018 focused on Venezuela and Tropical Storm Isaac. A press release 
from the Embassy that highlighted the visit’s merits would likely have shifted some publicity 
from the exercises to diplomatic signaling of the ship’s presence.  
The lesson-learned for naval diplomacy from the GUNSTON HALL’s visit to 
Cartagena de Indias is that diplomatic messaging and the resulting influence of a port visit 
can be outweighed and diminished by concurrent events, even those that are a part of the 
visit.  
D. FINDINGS 
The GUNSTON HALL’s deployment was not very effective at achieving influence 
throughout the host nations for a couple of reasons. First, the GUNSTON HALL’s visits did 
not bring about a significant amount of publicity in host nation news cycles. The primary 
reason for this lack of press is the prioritization of theater security priorities over bilateral 
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diplomatic ones. The visits’ main objective was not to achieve diplomatic effects but to meet 
theater-specific goals of strengthening security cooperation and partnership throughout the 
region. Another major contributor to low publicity was the lack of U.S. Embassy press 
releases in two of the three visits. Embassy press releases, like the one covering the 
GUNSTON HALL’s visit to Trinidad and Tobago, have been shown to generate follow-on 
articles in host nation news-cycles that generally reflect the same signaling of cooperation, 
support, and partnership.  
Second, the GUNSTON HALL’s deployment was not as successful in achieving 
influence because the events conducted in-port did not match the overarching U.S. security 
cooperation policy toward the host nation, particularly in the visits to Honduras, and Trinidad 
and Tobago. As a result, both U.S. and local publications did not include U.S. security 
cooperation elements to the respective host nation. The resulting diplomatic message directed 
to the host nation government and the public concerning the port visit is substandard in 
achieving soft-power influence. For example, the exclusion of counterterror exercises during 
the Port of Spain visit was a missed opportunity to reaffirm U.S. commitment and aid to 
Trinidad and Tobago’s burgeoning antiterrorism program. 
Though not as effective, this analysis does not suggest that the GUNSTON HALL’s 
deployment did not achieve some influential effects. As Charles Allen notes, even just the 
physical presence of a foreign warship in a host’s port creates latent diplomatic signals that 
can influence the government and population.194 However, this study into GUNSTON 
HALL’s deployment does suggest that the diplomatic signaling inherent to port visits can be 
optimized. The optimization is achieved by ensuring the visits’ events match U.S. security 
cooperation policy and enlisting the support of the relevant U.S. Embassy to generate press 
releases that have outsize effects on the host nation press. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The following conclusion consists of a cross comparison of each case study’s 
findings, recommendations to leaders and planners of the U.S. Navy, scholarly 
recommendations for follow-on research, and a bottom-line summary. 
A. CASE STUDY CROSS COMPARISON AND FINDINGS 
Ultimately, the port visits of the AMERICA’s deployment to South America were 
more effective in garnering diplomatic effects in the AoR than those of the GUNSTON 
HALL’s patrol to the Caribbean. Two sets of factors explain the difference: those of the 
deployments’ characteristics and those of the visits’ execution.  
Starting with the former set, the AMERICA’s deployment was inherently superior 
in two aspects: the type and status of the ship, and the transit’s purpose. In regard to the 
first aspect, the AMERICA is an aircraft-carrying capital ship, the first produced of its 
class, and represents significant military strength. Also, the AMERICA was the newest 
ship launched in the U.S. fleet at the time of its voyage. In contrast, the GUNSTON HALL 
does not carry aircraft, performs a supporting role to capital ships (like the AMERICA), 
represents significantly less military power, and was over 30 years old when it set out on 
its 2018 patrol. The implication of these differences is that the AMERICA is better suited 
for generating publicity and has greater potential for attaining influence through latent 
signaling.  
Transitioning to the deployments’ purposes, the AMERICA’s homeport shift was 
advantageous for achieving influence because it was devoid of normal operational 
commitments. Instead, the AMERICA’s crew was able to focus on and devote time to the 
diplomatic aspects of each port visit. Conversely, the GUNSTON HALL executed its patrol 
in support of three operational exercises that each had their own specific objectives. The 
crew’s focus and time in-port were split between diplomatic bilateral priorities and the 
goals of the overarching exercises of SS18, SPS18 and UNITAS 18. The clear implication, 
therefore, is a deployment dedicated to engagement activities will be more productive in 
that respect than one that features engagement as additional tasking. 
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While it is clear that the AMERICA was better equipped and purposed for 
achieving influence during its deployment, the execution of its port visits was also 
preferable to that of the GUNSTON HALL’s. Three primary aspects of the AMERICA’s 
visits had positive influential effects: in-port events matched and appropriately messaged 
to the overarching bilateral security policy, planning events that allowed for interaction 
with host-nation press, and coordinating with the relevant U.S. Embassy for press releases. 
On the other hand, the GUNSTON HALL visits did not involve the same policy matches, 
did not include many events that engaged local news affiliates, and only received U.S. 
Embassy support during one of the visits (Trinidad and Tobago). 
It is important to note that even though they were analyzed separately in this 
section, the visits’ execution was either advantaged or hampered by the deployment’s 
characteristics. In this sense, the AMERICA performed well because it was set up for 
diplomatic success. At the same time, the GUNSTON HALL’s execution of its visits was 
hamstrung by the competing exercise-specific objectives, which consumed in-port time 
and the crew’s focus. This in no way implies the crew of the GUNSTON HALL failed; not 
all naval deployments have diplomatic aims. However, this study suggests that even those 
deployments that are not geared toward gaining influence can attain soft power effects as 
long as there is planning flexibility and capacity to do so. As outlined in the next section, 
some actions, like coordinating with embassies, do not require significant effort but can 
optimize a ship’s ability to achieve influence during a port call.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS  
Although both case studies yielded meaningful lessons learned, the GUNSTON 
HALL’s port visits were especially significant to future U.S. tactics and policy. The patrol 
was more representative of the majority of U.S. naval deployments due to its routine nature 
and its inclusion of operational commitments apart from its diplomatic ones. Even though 
this study has shown them to be great diplomatic tools, homeport shifts, like the 
AMERICA’s, are relatively sporadic and often do not involve the transiting of AoRs. U.S. 
naval leaders and planners should incorporate the successful elements of the AMERICA’s 
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port calls into the routine visits of regularly scheduled deployments which involve 
priorities outside of diplomacy.  
Along these lines, planners should ensure, time and resources permitting, that port 
visits contain events, exercises, and messaging that highlight and exemplify U.S. security 
policy toward the visited country. Matching these elements to overall policy 
simultaneously boosts the influence achieved from public diplomacy, while providing 
tangibility to U.S. commitment and support toward the host-nation.  
Other events that are optimal for achieving influence and should be included are 
those that involve the host-nation media and press. These events allow U.S. leaders to shape 
the diplomatic messaging and latent signaling provided by the ship’s presence and to 
eliminate any misunderstandings of the public in relation to U.S. intentions and goals for 
the port call. Another benefit of press engagement is that host-nation news spreads the 
visit’s diplomatic messaging outside the port town or city and to the rest of the host country. 
This dissemination is critical to increasing the visit’s audience and therefore maximizing 
the influence achieved through public diplomacy. To capitalize on this dynamic, ship 
captains and other U.S. leaders present or embarked during the port call should seek 
opportunities to grant audiences with local and national press. One such opportunity is 
provided by KLEs, which offer excellent settings for press engagement with both U.S. and 
host-nation leadership. Critical for diplomatic signaling, events like these often highlight 
bilateral cooperation and amity.  
The ship’s public affairs officer should coordinate with the relevant U.S. Embassy 
for each of the deployment’s port calls to ensure the visits are covered by an Embassy press 
release. This study has shown that these releases are able to generate follow-on articles in 
the host-nation media, thus, increasing the visit’s opportunities for garnering influence 
through interaction with the public. 
Finally, naval personnel should recognize and mitigate situations where attaining 
diplomatic influence through port visits is difficult. These situations occur when theater or 
exercise objectives hinder the execution of bilateral diplomatic ones or when broader, more 
significant events, like UNITAS, overshadow the diplomatic aims of the port visit. 
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Whenever possible, in-port time should be managed to provide ample opportunity for 
accomplishing both diplomatic and theater/exercise goals. To mitigate being 
overshadowed, naval leaders and planners should shape their messaging to ensure that the 
post visit’s diplomatic events and objectives are given attention in press releases and by 
host-nation news.  
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Future research should apply this thesis’ framework to other AoRs to identify 
whether or not the same lessons-learned and recommendations apply for U.S. naval port 
visits outside of Latin America. Apart from port calls, further research could extend to 
identifying influence and effects from other aspects of defense diplomacy, such as 
multinational exercises, humanitarian/disaster relief operations, and sectors of U.S. 
security cooperation that involve the other service components.  
Outside of security studies, the original framework employed by this thesis 
provides a new way to analyze and identify influence and, therefore, has significant value 
to analysts that focus on soft power and the effects of diplomacy. However, primary news 
publications that include coverage of port visits are fairly sparse. In order to expand the 
field, future research should include other analytical sources, such as social media posts, 
interviews of host-nationals and U.S. naval personnel, and opinion surveys. Of particular 
interest are after-actions reports from the relevant warship, embassy, or combatant 
command that demonstrate what success and effects U.S. military leaders thought the 
diplomatic actions had achieved.  
D. SUMMARY 
This study has shown U.S. naval diplomacy through port calls has been successful 
at achieving positive effects throughout the visited countries of Latin America. However, 
the analysis also found the U.S. approach to achieving diplomatic influence has been 
uneven and shows room for improvement. After analyzing two U.S. naval deployments to 
the 4th Fleet AoR, the thesis makes three primary recommendations to naval leaders and 
planners. First, the crew’s actions and messaging while in-port should complement 
overarching bilateral priorities and objectives in order to maximize the diplomatic effects 
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of the port visit. Second, the ship’s leadership and public affairs team should include 
events, whenever possible, that offer opportunities for interaction and engagement with the 
host-nation’s press. This allows the diplomatic message to spread throughout the visited 
country, amplifying the effects achieved through public diplomacy. Finally, the ship’s 
public affairs team should seek the support of the relevant U.S. Embassy. Embassy press 
releases have demonstrated the ability to generate articles in the host-nation’s news-cycle 
that feature key aspects of the port visit; this heightened publicity increases host-nation 
awareness of the visit, allowing more opportunities to garner influence. 
With the return to great power competition, naval diplomacy through port visits 
will only continue to grow in importance as a critical component of U.S. soft power. Naval 
leaders and planners should seek to maximize diplomatic effects and influence by 
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